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A new approach in German innovation policy organizes contests of proposals for 
developing innovation networks. Based on an overview of the different programs, we 
investigate the advantages, problems and limitations of such an approach. We find that 
this type of policy may have a relatively large impact and can, therefore, be regarded as 
a rather efficient instrument of innovation policy. Compared to conventional policies, 
administration of the program is a much more critical issue. The contest approach may 
stimulate learning effects on the side of the administration but may also require a high 
degree of flexibility. The main disadvantage is the additional time that is required for 
conducting the contest. As a distinct ‘picking the winner’ approach, the contest 
approach is not suited as a means for achieving a leveling-out of regional welfare levels. 
JEL-classification:  H32, O18, O38, R11 
Keywords:   Innovation  policy,  regional competition, innovation networks 
 
Zusammenfassung 
“Wettbewerbe für Kooperation – Ein neuer Ansatz in der deutschen Innovationspolitik” 
In einem neuen Ansatz der deutschen Innovationspolitik werden Wettbewerbe für 
Vorschläge zur Entwicklung von Innovationsnetzwerken organisiert. Ausgehend von 
einem Überblick über diese Programme diskutieren wir Vorteile, Nachteile und 
Grenzen dieses Ansatzes. Es zeigt sich, dass diese Art der Innovationsförderung große 
Wirkungen erzeugen kann und daher vermutlich effizienter ist, als andere Typen von 
Programmen. Im Vergleich zu konventionellen Formen der Innovationsförderung ist 
allerdings die Administration des Programms sehr viel anspruchsvoller. Der 
Wettbewerbs-Ansatz kann Lerneffekte der Administration stimulieren aber auch ein 
relativ hohes Maß an Flexibilität erfordern. Der wesentliche Nachteil ist die zusätzliche 
Zeit, die für die Durchführung des Wettbewerbs benötigt wird. Da ein Wettbewerb ein 
ausgesprochenes ‘Pick the Winner’-Vefahren darstellt, ist dieser Ansatz für eine 
ausgleichsorientierte Regionalpolitik kaum geeignet. 
JEL-Klassifikation:  H32, O18, O38, R11 
Schlagworte: Innovationspolitik,  Wettbewerb zwischen Regionen, 
Innovationsnetzwerke 
 




A new approach has emerged in German innovation policy. The main novelty 
of this approach is that the allocation of pubic support is based on contests of 
initiatives for self-organized cooperation in Research and Development 
(R&D). In programs like BioRegio (Dohse, 2000, 2003; www.bioregio.com), 
EXIST (Kulicke, 2003; www.exist.de) and InnoRegio (Eickelpasch, Kauffeld 
and Pfeiffer, 2002; www.innoregio.de), a Federal Ministry invites local groups 
or ‘networks’ of actors to submit proposals for cooperative R&D projects with 
the prospect of attaining support for implementation of the concept. Based on 
an evaluation of the submitted proposals, the most promising initiatives are 
selected for public support. In most of the programs, the actors of an initiative 
are supposed to be located in the same region. In these cases, the approach can 
be regarded as a form of a regionalized innovation policy. 
This paper provides an overview and discussion of the new policy 
approach with its merits and demerits. Section 2 introduces the basic elements 
of the new cooperation-contest programs. An overview of the organization of 
contests and conditions is given in section 3. Section 4 deals with the economic 
rationale and justification of the new policy. The discussion of potential 
advantages, problems and limitations of allocating R&D subsidies by contests 
in section 5 is illustrated with some practical experience with this type of 
program made so far. Section 6 investigates in more detail what became of the 
‘losers’ of the contest, i.e. those initiatives that were not selected for funding. 
This issue is of crucial importance for an assessment of this new approach to 
technology policy (section 7). 
2.  Competition of concepts for innovative labor division: the basic 
approach 
Since the mid-1990s German innovation policy has increasingly applied 
competitive elements, particularly for the promotion of cooperative R&D 
(BMBF, 2002). The common aim of these new programs is to stimulate the 
division of innovative labor and, thereby, to mobilize potentials for innovation  
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and creativity. This is done by conducting a contest of concepts for the 
organization of cooperation within ‘networks’. In most of these programs the 
procedure consists of three stages: 
•  Stage I: Groups of actors are invited to submit a proposal for a concept to 
organize cooperative innovation activity with the prospect of gaining a 
assistance for realization. The proposal should include an outline of the 
expected future development of the respective technology, an estimation of 
its economic relevance in terms of expected market volume, an assessment 
of the abilities of the participants in the planned network and the expected 
chances of success. In those programs which are explicitly focused on a 
regional level, the strengths of the respective region in the particular 
technological field have to be explicated. This may include the quality of 
the labor market, the presence of innovation relevant services (e.g. in the 
fields of technical support and finance), the extent and nature of already 
existing private and public R&D in the region as well as the degree of 
clustering and interaction. Usually, only a rough outline of the concept is 
required at this first stage. 
•  Stage II is the selection of proposals for further elaboration and assistance. 
In most of the programs, the evaluation of concepts was mainly carried out 
by a jury of external experts, and in almost all cases the selection of 
concepts for final funding was organized in two rounds. In the first round, 
the outlines of concepts submitted in stage I are reviewed and a selection of 
these proposals is then invited to participate in a second round of the 
contest. There is no compensation for the effort of developing the initial 
first-stage proposal for those initiatives, which are not selected for further 
assistance. In the second round of the selection procedure, the initial 
concepts are elaborated further usually supported by advice and public 
funding. In this second round, the administration may provide ‘custom-
tailored’ support that accounts for the specific requirements of the project 
and has the opportunity to steer the design of concepts in a certain 
direction. The applicants can also discuss their ideas with the 
administration before officially submitting their proposal. The final  
 
3
selection is then made from the more elaborated concepts that resulted from 
the second round. 
•  Stage III is the realization of the selected proposals with public support 
over a longer period of time. In some of the programs (e.g., EXIST, 
InnoRegio) some exchange of information about concepts and solutions 
between program participants had been organized as part of the 
complementary research. 
In most of the contests that have been conducted so far only a rather small 
share of initial applications has been selected for funding (see section 3 for 
details). However, in several cases the administration that had organized the 
initial contest or another public body have launched follow-up programs – 
some of them again in the form of a contest – that were specifically designed 
for those initiatives that had not been selected in the initial competition, the 
‘losers’. Therefore, one can well identify certain program ‘families’. These 
follow-up programs may be regarded a stage IV of the new approach. 
3.  The programs under review: a selective overview 
The programs under review have two special characteristics. First, they aim at 
stimulating cooperation or networks in order to strengthen the innovative 
potential of actors involved. Second, initiatives to be supported are selected by 
means of a contest. While some of the programs are focused on a certain 
technological field, others are of a more general character and have no such 
specific technological orientation. Most of the programs were initiated by the 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). Some have also 
been launched by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor (BMWA). 
The first program of this type in Germany was BioRegio (Cooke, 2002; 
Dohse, 2000, 2003). Its apparent success paved the way for other programs of 
this kind. The BioRegio program was launched by the BMBF in the year 1995 
with the aim of strengthening German biotechnology industry and, thus, to 
catch up with the leading nations in this field, the US and the UK in particular. 
At that time, the development of the German biotechnology industry was  
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hindered by several obstacles, mainly the legal framework, the lack of 
sufficiently innovative companies, poor availability of venture capital as well 
as the low acceptance of innovation in this field by the German society. The 
BioRegio contest was designed to stimulate cooperation and division of 
innovative labor between private firms, universities, non-university research 
institutes, and venture capitalists in certain regions. Proposals for this program 
were required to outline the strengths of the regional biotechnology sector and 
to make propositions for its future development, particularly for research 
projects and cooperation between actors in the region. There were no 
restrictions with regard to the number of participants or the delineation of the 
respective region. An independent international jury with representatives from 
science, industry and labor unions selected four winning initiatives out of 17 
proposals submitted according to a detailed list of criteria provided by the 
ministry.
2 The selection was completed in November 1996. These winning 
regions were given funding of about 90 million Euros for realizing their 
proposed projects. 
Although there was no official complementary evaluative research for the 
BioRegio program, as of yet
3, it was soon regarded rather successful in 
stimulating the biotechnology industry, not only in the supported regions but 
nationwide (Dohse 2000; Cooke, 2002). The widely acclaimed success of 
BioRegio paved the way for further programs aiming at stimulating R&D in 
the biotechnology field like BioProfile, BioChance and BioFuture. In these 
programs, losers of the BioRegio contest received a further chance for attaining 
public support. With the exception of BioChance, the follow-up programs were 
                                                 
2 The main criteria by which the regions were selected was the economic and the scientific 
potential of private firms, universities and other public research facilities in the region, the 
intensity of intraregional interaction between the different firms and research institutes, 
availability of supporting services and the strategies for converting research results into new 
products including the support of innovative start-ups. See BMBF (1995). 
3 An official ex-post evaluation of the BioRegio program will start in the year 2005.  
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also based on a contest.
4 In the BioFuture program, several successive contests 
have been conducted. 
 
Table 1: Selected contest oriented programs in support of regional R&D co-
operation in Germany 
Type of support 




































Private firms and 
public research 
institutes  
X X   




Private firms and 
public research 
institutes 
X X   
1999 - 2006  50 mill.  30  3  90 







X    





At least three 
partners thereof 
one university 
 X  X 






At least three 
partners thereof 
one university 
 X  X 
2002 - 2005  10 mill.  45  10  78 
InnoRegio Regional 









X X X 
1999 - 2006  253 mill.  444  23  95 
InnoNet* Cooperation  in 
R&D 
Private SMEs and 
public research 
institutes 
X    
1999 - 2005  33 mill.   404  51  87 
NEMO* Cooperation  in 
R&D 
Private SMEs and 
public research 
institutes 
 X  X 










X X   
2000 - 2006  118 mill.  350  72  79 
* Sponsored by the BMWA, all the others by the BMBF. ** Planned spending until end of 2006.  
SME: small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Source: Own compilation. 
                                                 




The aim of the EXIST program introduced in December 1997 was to 
improve the knowledge transfer between universities and the commercial 
sector by promoting entrepreneurship and encouraging start-ups of students 
and academic personnel
5. In its initial form, the EXIST program invited 
proposals of concepts to stimulate new firm formation out of universities by 
improving the climate for start-ups at universities and by motivating, training 
and supporting entrepreneurial personalities. These proposals were supposed to 
particularly entail cooperation in networks that consist of universities and at 
least two external partners like public research institutes, private enterprises or 
chambers of commerce and other business associations. The EXIST program 
provides support for establishing cooperative relationships between these 
actors and for stimulating entrepreneurship. Each network was funded with 
about 1 million Euros for three years. The selection of proposals for final 
funding was made by an independent jury in two rounds. In the initial EXIST 
program only five applications out of 105 were selected. However, the EXIST 
program was followed by the EXIST-Transfer program in which proposals that 
had been rejected in the initial contest could apply for assistance. 
The InnoRegio program was launched by the BMBF in April 1999. The 
aim of the program was to strengthen innovative and economic 
competitiveness in East Germany, that part of the country that had been under a 
socialistic regime until 1990. The contest invited concepts for regional 
innovation networks consisting of private firms, universities and other public 
research institutes. The InnoRegio program was limited to East Germany but 
not to certain industries or technologies. Besides the restriction to East 
Germany, the spatial delineation of regions participating in the contest was not 
in any way pre-determined. There have been 444 initial proposals submitted. 
An independent jury chose those 25 concepts that were to be included into the 
second round of the selection procedure for further elaboration. Main criteria 
for this procedure were the relevance of the network for innovation processes 
                                                 
5 For further information see Kulicke (2003) and www.exist.de.  
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and economic development in the respective region, complementarities of 
participants in the proposed network as well as the novelty and quality of the 
planned R&D. The initiatives selected for the second round of the contest were 
awarded up to approximately 153,400 Euro each for preparing a more detailed 
concept. In this second round, the initiatives were also provided immaterial 
support from the Ministry in form of moderators who monitored and helped to 
organize communication as well as with free consultancy on subject areas. The 
jury selected 23 concepts for final funding in the third stage. Activities eligible 
for funding are R&D projects as well as qualification measures and the 
management of the proposed network.
6 InnoRegio may be regarded as a 
prototype of programs that aimed at improving regional innovative networks 
such as InnoNet, NEMO and Lernende Regionen (Learning Region).  
4.  Theoretical foundations and justification of the new program type 
Three strands of argument may provide a theoretical foundation and 
justification for the policies under inspection here. One main element of a 
theoretical foundation is given by recent approaches to explain innovation 
behavior, particularly in a regional context (section 4.1). A justification of 
public measures for promoting R&D cooperation can be based on uncertainty 
of innovative outcomes and transaction cost that can work as a severe 
impediment for establishing and maintaining such type of relationship (section 
4.2). And finally, the pronounced heterogeneity of innovation processes and 
regional systems competition provide some rational for the approach (section 
4.3). 
4.1  Theories of innovation behavior 
Innovation activity is characterized by a division of labor, which tends to be 
shaped by geography (Fritsch, 2005). One indication for the importance of 
                                                 
6 For further information see www.unternehmen-region.de and www.diw.de/innoregio  
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location is the clustering of innovation activity found in many empirical 
studies.
7 Clustering suggests that there are agglomeration advantages at work 
that stimulate R&D (Enright, 2003; Porter, 1998). Among the most important 
of these agglomeration advantages are a relatively high potential for face-to-
face contacts within clusters, the presence of positive external effects, easy 
access to research institutions as well as to differentiated input markets such as 
the labor market and the market for specialized services. All of these factors 
may facilitate the generation and the transfer (spillover) of knowledge, which 
constitutes the key element of innovation activity. Another indication for a 
significant role of location for R&D is the evidence found in many empirical 
studies that the diffusion of new knowledge tends to be heavily concentrated 
around its source. Obviously, spatial proximity is of significant importance for 
such knowledge flows and, therefore, is conducive for a division of innovative 
labor that necessitates knowledge transfers between the parties involved. 
The pronounced regional dimension of innovation processes implies that 
the quality of regional innovation systems may differ considerably. Recent 
approaches to a theory of regional innovation
8 share the common hypothesis 
that the main factor for explaining the quality of regional innovation activity is 
not size or endowment
9 but rather the level and the quality of interaction within 
and between regional innovation systems. Such interaction constitutes an 
important vehicle for the diffusion of knowledge that is a necessary 
precondition for a division of innovative labor. Therefore, stimulating the 
                                                 
7 For empirical evidence see Audretsch and Feldman (1996a), Cooke (2002, 130-156) and 
Baptista and Swann (1998). 
8 These recent approaches are the notion of regional innovation systems (cf. Cooke, Uranga 
and Etxebarria, 1997; Cooke, 2004; Edquist, 1997), the concept of industrial districts (cf. 
Porter 1998 and the contributions in Pyke, Beccatini and Sengenberger, 1990), the network 
approach (cf. Camagni, 1991; Grabher, 1993), and the concept of “innovative milieux” 
(Crevoisier and Maillat, 1991; Ratti, Bramanti and Gordon, 1997). See Cooke (2005) for a 
review of recent developments. 
9 There are numerous empirical examples of highly effective clusters in remote, sparsely 
polulated areas which have fewer employees than there are inhabitants in a small town (Porter, 
1998; van der Linde, 2003). This suggests that only a fraction of the differences in the 




division of innovative labor could be a promising starting point for a policy 
that aims at promoting regional R&D activity. 
4.2  Specific problems of labor division in R&D 
The recognition that differences in the performance of innovation systems may 
well be explained by the intensity of R&D cooperation and division of 
innovative labor is only a first step in justifying the cooperation-contest type of 
program. In the second step, it should be shown that interaction for a mutually 
beneficial division of innovative labor may be difficult to establish. There are, 
indeed, a number of hurdles for the establishment and maintenance of 
interaction in the field of R&D (see Fritsch 2001 for an overview). 
 One of these special problems is that relationships in R&D processes can 
not be completely specified since the outcome of an innovation process is 
unknown in advance. Because such incomplete contracts include the danger of 
the exchange partners behaving in an opportunistic way, establishing such 
relationships requires some trust. This implies that actors must be ‘linked’ 
(Kranton and Minehart, 2001), i.e. they have to spend some actor-specific 
transaction cost. This cost may be incurred while identifying a suitable 
transaction partner, when establishing an appropriate interface for the exchange 
relationship or by building up some reputation and trust in order to reduce the 
danger of opportunistic behavior to a reasonable level. Another reason why a 
division of innovative labor may necessitate investment in actor-specific 
transaction cost is that the required inputs are often highly specialized and not 
commonly traded on large markets. Indeed, markets for skills and resources 
that are important for innovation activity may well be rather ’thin’ with only 
very few suppliers available and transactions taking place rather infrequently. 
For this reason, an immense amount of search costs might be necessary for  
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identifying a suitable transaction partner and negotiations about the conditions 
of an exchange may be rather costly.
10 
Because for these reasons, mutually beneficial modes of labor division in 
the field of R&D do not emerge more or less automatically, a policy that 
stimulates such relationship may achieve considerable improvements of 
innovative capacity and the efficiency of innovation systems. This pertains to 
formalized relationship as well as to rather informal types of interaction. 
4.3  Variety and systems competition 
Innovation processes in different technological fields, industries and regions 
can have rather specialized characteristics that require specific solutions (see 
Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). For this reason, policy programs should be 
designed in a way that they provide sufficient room for different solutions to 
emerge. Variety of approaches allows for learning from experience with 
different ways of problem solving and to identify superior solutions. It is also a 
basic precondition for competition because if all submitted concepts were 
identical a contest would not make sense. Competition between alternative 
approaches of organizing a division of innovative labor may be regarded an 
effective means of stimulating the search for better solutions and their 
diffusion. This is a key argument in the theory of federalism or, more 
generally, systems competition (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999; Vanberg and 
Kerber, 1994).  
By inviting propositions for organizing the division of innovative labor 
according to the needs of the respective project, the cooperation-contest 
                                                 
10 If such a cooperative relationship comes about, it may involve even more advantages than 
intensified division of innovative labor and increased efficiency of R&D processes. One such 
further advantage of R&D cooperation is that the relationships could involve relatively ‘open’ 
exchange of information that may be stimulating for R&D activity (Axelsson, 1992; Lundvall, 
1993; Powell, 1990). Therefore, cooperative relationships in R&D may work as an important 
medium for knowledge spillovers. Not only formalized cooperative relationships like joint 
ventures or contract research, but also informal relationships like ‘information trading’ are 
often important for such knowledge spillovers to emerge and may play a significant role for 
stimulating innovation activity (e.g., von Hippel, 1987).  
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approach allows for a high degree of variety and systems competition. Because 
the concepts are developed ‘bottom-up’ by the potential participants of the 
proposed innovation network, it is in the very nature of this type of program 
that solutions can be custom-tailored and innovative. Moreover, competition 
for public assistance creates incentives for developing concepts that are of high 
quality. Hence, the competition-contest approach can work as a laboratory for 
discovering and diffusing superior ways to organize a division of innovative 
labor. For these reasons, innovation policy programs, which allow for a variety 
of solutions and allocate assistance by means of competition are probably more 
appropriate and efficient than a completely centralized one-size-fits-all 
approach (Tödtling and Trippl, 2005) that provides only one type of assistance. 
In summarizing the arguments that were briefly reviewed in this section, 
there are good grounds to suggest a decentralized approach to innovation 
policy that tries to stimulate the diverse kinds of innovative labor division. 
Such policy measures may be particularly justified because mutual beneficial 
cooperation in the field of R&D may not emerge automatically. There are 
strong reasons to expect that competition between different solutions will help 
to find a superior alternative. Competition may also stimulate diffusion of such 
superior solutions. 
5.  Possible advantages of the cooperation-contest approach, critical 
issues and limitations 
The cooperation-contest type programs, which are under review, can have a 
number of important advantages compared to a conventional innovation 
assistance program that provides the same type of solution to all applicants. 
These possible merits of the new approach are explicated in section 5.1. The 
following two sections then deal with critical issues (section 5.2) and 
limitations (section 5.3). In this discussion we bring in some available 
empirical evidence from the new types of program.
11 Our point of reference for 
                                                 
11 The available evidence on the effects of the programs is still rather limited, mainly, because 
most of the programs are still in operation.  
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assessing the merits and demerits of the new approach is the common practice 
of a policy operated at the central state level that allocates only one kind of 
assistance. If such one-size-fits-all programs (Toedtling and Trippl, 2005) 
include discretionary decisions about public assistance, these decisions are 
typically made successively case-by-case and are based on a common set of 
criteria. In contrast, decisions in a contest are based on a simultaneous 
comparison and ranking of all submitted applications at a certain point of time. 
5.1 Possible  advantages 
Compared to the standard procedure of allocating identical forms of R&D 
support successively on a case-by-case basis, the cooperation-contest type of 
program provides a number of advantages. While some of these advantages 
result from the contest mode of allocation, other advantages are a consequence 
of the self-organization and the variety of solutions that is allowed. 
Quality of submitted concepts: The general expectation that competition 
generates incentives for a high level of performance may also hold for the 
quality of concepts submitted in a contest for public assistance. Not only the 
competition between concepts, but also interaction with the administration and 
the support that firms experience when they elaborate their concept during the 
selection process may lead to significant quality improvements. Generally, the 
selection procedure can produce learning effects for applicants that can be 
relatively pronounce if the feedback that they receive is rich and profound. 
Such learning effects may be relevant for all kinds of applicants, for the 
winners which are selected for assistance and for the losers whose applications 
are rejected. The intensity and the quality of the feedback depend critically on 
the administrative implementation and management of the contest. 
Quality of project selection: The contest mode of selection is to decide 
about assistance at a time when all alternative applications are known and can 
be simultaneously taken into consideration. Therefore, selection decisions can 
be based on more relevant information and be of higher quality than in the 
conventional approach that is characterized by successive case-by-case  
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decisions. In the conventional approach, the administration decides whether to 
provide assistance or not when an application has been submitted. At the time 
when such a decision is made, the administration does not know if later 
applications will be of higher or lower quality than the one which has to be 
decided on. Incomplete information about the relevant alternatives, hence, 
limits the possibilities of selecting the most promising projects considerably. If 
decisions are made by an independent jury of experts, as it has been the case in 
nearly all of the programs under review, the quality of the selection may also 
be higher as compared to decisions that are made by a public administration. 
Moreover, since contests may be addressed to a wider group of potential 
applicants than conventional programs they may gain more attention, publicity 
and public awareness than conventional programs. Hence, the pressure for 
justification of decisions is higher and may induce a more transparent design of 
the decision procedure. However, this publicity may also be regarded as a 
disadvantage and induce attempts to conceal details of the decision process 
(see section 5.3). 
Self-organizing the division of innovative labor: It can be regarded as a 
great advantage of the approach that applicants have considerable degrees of 
freedom in choosing the organizational form of innovative labor division that 
corresponds to their specific problems and needs. Because solutions are 
developed bottom-up by the potential participants of the proposed innovation 
network, they can be expected to be more suitable than in a program that 
provides a uniform type of assistance to all applicants. Moreover, policy 
makers largely avoid the pretence of knowledge-problem, i.e. to a priory 
assume a certain type of assistance or project design appropriate. By designing 
the relevant network, applicants also give a definition of its extent, e.g. the 
relevant regional scope. Therefore, no predetermined delineation according to 
administrative criteria is necessary, as would be the case in a program in which 
the availability of funds is limited to certain assisted areas that may be too 
small to include all relevant actors or sources of knowledge spillovers. Hence,  
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artificial discrimination against certain potential members of the network due 
to administrative criteria can be avoided.
12 
Mobilization of innovative activity: A further important advantage of the 
cooperation-contest approach is that it provides incentives for self-
organization. When initiatives submit their proposal to the administration they 
have already made the first important step towards self-organizing their future 
division of labor and building an innovation network. Therefore, this type of 
program can generate relatively strong mobilization effects for innovative 
activity by stimulating the division of innovative labor. It can induce actors to 
establish new contacts, deepen existing relationships and create new innovation 
networks that have not existed, yet. The competition approach, therefore, is 
more likely to fuel creativity, the generation of new ideas and the division of 
innovative labor than conventional assistance policy. This is particularly 
relevant in regions with a low level of innovation activity where conventional 
R&D promotion programs find few occasions for funding and, therefore, can 
have only a limited effect.  
Information about the incentives for self-organization of innovation 
activity is available from the complementary research for the InnoRegio 
program (see Eickelpasch, Pfeiffer and Pfirrmann, 2004). Members of those 
InnoRegio initiatives that have been selected for funding in the final stage of 
the program have been asked by a postal inquiry whether they knew their 
InnoRegio partners previous to participating in the contest, and whether they 
maintained cooperative relationship with these actors before the application 
procedure. About half of the respondents acknowledged that they knew only 
some of their future partners before the initiation of the InnoRegio project and 
five percent stated that they knew none of them. Only three percent of 
respondents were acquainted with all their InnoRegio partners before they 
began. With regard to cooperative relationship with their InnoRegio partners, it 
                                                 
12 However, some spatial restrictions may apply. In most of these programs partners located far 
away from the network-‘core’ were not eligible for funding. In the InnoRegio program, for 
example, funding was limited to actors located in East Germany. And as a general restriction of 
German innovation policy, financial support is not granted to actors located abroad.  
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was found that only one percent of the participants had cooperative relationship 
with all of the partners before the contest and four percent had cooperative 
relationship with “many” of them (figure 1). Nearly one fifth of the 
respondents (19 percent) did not cooperate with any of their InnoRegio 
partners before (category “nobody”) and 68 percent already had cooperative 
relationship with only “some” of them. According to these figures, there can be 
no doubt that the InnoRegio contest had a considerable mobilizing effect for 
the self-organization of innovative networks. 
Figure 1: Relationship of InnoRegio partners before participation in the contest 
(percentages) 
Source: DIW Berlin, Survey in 2000, N=727. 
 
Benefits of losers, mobilization surplus, and the impact of public funds: 
The mobilization of innovative potential that is induced by the cooperation-
contest-type programs is closely connected with benefits of the losers, i.e. those 
firms that did not succeed to be selected for funding in the contest. One 
important benefit for losers can be that in developing their concept they have 
established contact to other actors that may be helpful later on. In particular, 
they still have their concept for a certain form of innovative labor division and 
may at least partly realize this concept without public support or in the 
framework of other programs. These benefits of losers constitute a main 
difference between the cooperation-contest type of program and conventional 
R&D subsidies. Moreover, support that was received in developing the concept 
and feedback on the submitted concept by the public administration may prove 

























to be of considerable future value. The benefits of the loser may result in a 
‘mobilization surplus’ that manifests in those rejected applications, which are 
further pursued (see section 6). Hence, programs of the cooperation-contest 
type may have a considerably higher impact than conventional programs of 
comparable budget size and may spend public resources more effectively. 
The review of contest programs (section 3, table 1) showed that in most of 
these programs the share of non-selected applications was well above eighty 
percent. This rejection rate is much higher than what can be found for many of 
the conventional R&D promotion programs. 
Learning effects for policy makers and public administration: It is the very 
nature of a contest approach, that applicants have considerable degrees of 
freedom for expressing their specific needs and desires in the design of a 
proposal. Policy makers and the public administrators have, therefore, the 
opportunity to learn from the proposals as from evaluation of realized concepts 
for a more appropriate design of future programs. Such learning effects of the 
administration are well reflected in the follow-up programs of BioRegio, 
EXIST and InnoRegio (cf. section 3 and table 1) that benefited from the 
experiences that have been made with earlier programs of the cooperation-
contest type. 
As a discovery procedure, a cooperation-contest for assistance may 
stimulate the division of innovative labor, the knowledge of how to organize 
and manage an innovative network as well as the ability of policy of dealing 
with cooperative R&D. 
5.2 Critical  issues 
One problematic issue of the contest approach as compared to conventional 
policy measures is the relatively large organizational effort for the 
administration of the program: Conducting a contest may well require more 
time and resources on the side of the public administration than is needed for a 
conventional program, especially if a jury of experts is involved in the 
selection procedure. Not only the public administration, but also applicants  
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may have higher effort of participating in a contest as compared to a program 
with successive case-by-case selection. The above mentioned quality 
enhancing effect of competition may require more resources for preparing a 
promising application than in case of a conventional R&D subsidy. This may 
particularly hold if the application has to include not only the design of a 
certain R&D project but also a concept for organizing the division of 
innovative labor in a network of actors, as is the case in many of the contest-
type programs (see section 5). Developing a concept for joint R&D requires 
identification and selection of potential partners as well as the ex-ante 
coordination of the project. If, however, only a rough outline is necessary for 
the first round of the selection procedure, the effort of application may be even 
less than that in a conventional program. 
Need of time for the contest: Conducting a contest may take more time 
between the initial application and the final funding decision than what is 
required for a conventional program. This may slow down innovation 
processes considerably and endanger the benefits such as first-mover 
advantages. One possible reason for the additional time that is required might 
be the larger administrative effort that is necessary for carrying out such a 
contest. Second, decisions cannot be made immediately upon receipt of a 
proposal but only when a certain deadline has been reached, after which no 
further application is considered in the selection process. It is, therefore, 
important that the bid-time for submitting proposals is short, and that selection 
decisions are made promptly. In the BioRegio and the EXIST program, for 
example, the time between the start of the contest until final selection was 
about one year. In EXIST Transfer about five months were required. In 
InnoRegio the time for the whole contest amounted to 20 months. In an inquiry 
of the winners and loser of the BioRegio contest, the respondents qualified the 
interregional competition as an appropriate selection mode but criticized the 
amount of time needed (Dohse 2000). Also participants of the InnoRegio 
contest complained about the complex and long lasting decision procedure 
(Eickelpasch, Kauffeld and Pfeiffer 2002). Especially those participants who 
planned to realize high-tech projects were afraid to lose important first-mover 
advantages due to the long-lasting selection process.  
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Discouragement and discrimination of losers: We have already 
emphasized (section 4.1) that even the losers of a cooperation-contest may gain 
considerable benefits from participating in terms of contacts, concepts and 
feedback to their ideas. They could, however, also feel as if they were being 
‘punished’ for three reasons. First, although they may have learned something 
from the application process, at least a part of their effort for the application 
procedure was in vain. Second, losers in the contest may suffer from a bad 
reputation of not being selected. And third, because the ‘winners’ in the contest 
get public support for their R&D, those firms that are not rewarded have a 
competitive disadvantage (Dohse, 2000). This effect, that is also relevant for 
conventional assistance schemes, would be particularly discriminating if the 
difference in the quality of concepts was not very significant. If there are 
promising concepts among those applications that have not been selected in the 
initial contest, it may be reasonable for policy to provide some assistance also 
for these proposals. Such a support for losers of the contest is, however, a 
rather sensitive issue. Aftercare should provide considerably less assistance 
than is given to the winners of the initial contest because otherwise it would 
distort the incentive to compete. 
Relatively high administrative flexibility required: It constitutes a basic 
requirement of any contest that the participants have some degree of freedom 
in the design of their concepts. The search for concepts constitutes a discovery 
procedure from which results can not be predicted. As already mentioned, this 
may lead to learning processes on the side of the administration (section 4.1), 
but implementation of a winning concept may also require new modes of 
support or administrative innovation and flexibility. Another disadvantage in 
the view of the administration can be a relatively high public and political 
pressure. It is, for example, quite likely that political representatives of regions 
participate in a contest campaign in favor of their clientele. Such political 
pressure may distort the selection process. Dealing with public and political 
pressure, therefore, is an important issue for designing and administrating this 
type of program.  
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There can be no doubt that the quality of the selection decisions is of 
critical importance for the effectiveness of this program-type. The decision 
procedure should identify and select the most promising projects with a high 
degree or reliability. Trust in an unbiased quality oriented selection procedure 
is decisive for the motivation of applicants to develop and submit a proposal. 
So far, there have been no serious complaints with regards to the quality of the 
selection procedure. Complementary research showed that participants in 
contest-type programs, winners as well as losers, evaluated the selection as fair 
(Dohse, 2000; Belitz, Pfirmann and Eschenbach, 2002). At least, there is no 
indication at all that the quality of decision is lower than in conventional case-
by-case decision programs. 
All these issues may constitute severe problems or disadvantages of the 
contest approach. They can, however, be lowered or even eliminated by an 
appropriate implementation and administration of the policy. We can conclude 
from the mentioned problems that 
•  effort for applicants should be limited to a plausible level, 
•  bid-times should be short and decisions made rather quickly, 
•  feedback on proposals should be helpful and encouraging even for the 
losers of the contest, 
•  administrating the program may require a relatively high degree of 
flexibility, and that 
•  ways should be found to deal with public and political pressure induced by 
the contest. 
Moreover, it may be desirable to devote some care to the losers of the contest 
in order to not discourage but stimulate their innovative potentials.  In 
Germany, this has been quite often done by means of follow-up programs in 
which those initiatives could apply for assistance that have not been selected in 
the initial contest (see section 3).  
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5.3  Limitations of the approach 
The contest approach is, by its very nature, a ‘picking the winner’ procedure 
and is, therefore, not well suited for policies aiming at leveling-out regional 
welfare levels. The competition is organized in order to select the most 
promising concepts and not those alternatives that have been submitted by the 
poorest or most needy applicants. Any attempt to account for distributional 
‘justice’ in the selection procedure would endanger the quality of the selection.  
Limiting the competition to certain types of applicants or to part of the 
country which are economically backwards (like the InnoRegio program that 
was limited to East Germany) does in no way change this bias towards 
supporting the most promising initiatives. With a quality-oriented selection 
mechanism, nothing favors proposals that come from the most needy applicant 
or most lagging region. For the support of the less favored initiatives or 
regions, other measures of a more enabling character should be applied. 
6.  A closer look at the mobilization surplus: what have the losers done? 
We have argued that programs of the cooperation-contest type may create 
considerable benefits even for the losers of the contest that are not selected for 
funding. This effect may be quite relevant given the large share of rejected 
applications that in many of the programs amount to more than 80 percent 
(table 1). This advantage of the programs under review may, however, be 
contradicted if the losers are discouraged by not being selected. It is, therefore, 
of special interest what those applicants do, which were not selected in the 
program. 
In order to shed some light on this issue, postal questionnaires were sent 
out to the 419 rejected applicants of the InnoRegio contest (see DIW, 2005). 
The inquiry was carried out in early 2005, more than five years after the 
selection of projects in the contest and resulted in usable information from  
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about 178 of the rejected initiatives.
13 In 42 percent of these cases (74 
applicants) the project idea had been abandoned immediately after the rejection 
in the InnoRegio contest. In 18 percent of the cases (32 applicants) the project 
was pursued for a while but then given up. About 40 percent of the respondents 
(72 cases) realized their idea despite the rejection in the InnoRegio program 
and in most of these cases this process is still under way. Among those cases in 
which the project idea was not abandoned, 61 percent received some public 
funding in the framework of other programs (44 out of 72 projects), whereas 39 
percent of these projects (28 cases) were set up without any significant public 
assistance. At that point of time, 22 winners of the InnoRegio contest were still 
active
14 realizing their project with assistance of the program. This means that 
for each initiative funded in the InnoRegio program there were more than three 
rejected initiatives of which we know for sure that they are or have been 
realized in one or another way. About 1.7 projects per assisted InnoRegio case 
have been put into practice without public funding in the framework of other 
programs. It should be noted that these figures give the lower limit of the 
mobilization effect since there may be some more projects that have been 
implemented among those initiative which did not respond to our inquiry. We 
can conclude that the overall mobilization of innovative potential that resulted 
from the InnoRegio program has considerably exceeded the amount of activity 
that is funded by the program. 
This conclusion is confirmed in a study by Krantz, Lilischkis and Wessels 
(2000) who investigated the development of 47 out of the 104 rejected 
concepts that have been submitted to the initial EXIST contest.
15 The inquiry 
was carried out three years after the selection for funding was made. In 37 
cases, the contest-losers that had been included in the study were realizing their 
project, often in a reduced form. In 67 percent of these cases, the realization of 
                                                 
13 94 of the questionnaires could not be delivered and 147 applicants did not react, refused to 
answer or were for other reasons unable to provide the required information. 
14 One initiative selected for funding in the InnoRegio program was abandoned. 
15 See section 2 for a brief description of this program. The selection of these cases is not 
entirely clear and it can not be completely excluded that particularly the relatively promising 
initiatives have been included in the sample.  
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the project was based on the universities’ own funds or by the respective 
Federal State (Land). In 44 percent of the cases private resources were raised. 
Given that only five initiatives had been selected for funding in this contest, the 
relation of realized projects over projects selected is much higher than in the 
case of InnoRegio. In both cases one may well presume that the mobilization 
surplus is at least as important as the funding of the winners. 
7. Conclusions 
The cooperation-contest approach to R&D incentives has a number of 
important advantages over conventional programs that allocate support on the 
basis of successive case-by-case decisions. One main advantage of this 
program type is that applicants have a high degree of freedom in the design of 
their project so that assistance can be custom-tailored and much better suited 
than in a one-size-fits-all approach. Hence, pretence-of-knowledge problems 
are largely avoided. Not only, that it is well suited for stimulating the division 
of innovative labor, which is a critical issue for the efficiency of innovation 
systems. The programs can also generate relatively strong mobilization effects 
and, in so doing, achieve a high impact of public funds. Moreover, this type of 
policy can be a valuable means for the administration to learn about demands 
and bottlenecks of innovative actors helping to design appropriate policy 
measures. However, the cooperation-context programs are rather demanding 
with regards to implementation and administration. Proper implementation of 
the policy is a crucial issue for the advantages of the approach to become 
effective and to keep the problems of the approach within reasonable limits. As 
a ‘picking the winner’-approach, contests are not suited as a means of a 
leveling-out policy that is aiming at economic cohesion. 
A number of important questions remain unanswered and should be 
subject of further research. It is not clear from a conceptual point of view as to 
how far the policy should care for the losers of the contest. We have argued 
that even the losers may benefit from participating in the contest because they 
may receive valuable feedback on their concept during the selection procedure, 
and that they could try to implement their ideas without further assistance.  
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Supporting the loser could be particularly regarded an option if the quality of 
the winning and the loosing proposals is very close so that funding of winners 
could result in a considerable distortion of competition on the output market.  
In the future, contests will probably be of growing importance for German 
innovation policy, as official statements indicate (Blum 2001, BMBF 2002). 
Further research will be needed to investigate thoroughly the effectiveness of 
contests for innovation policy. A main focus of this research should be on the 
implementation of the programs because this issue appears to be of crucial 
importance for the advantages of the approach to become effective. In addition, 
special attention should be paid to the quality and the development of the 
cooperative networks, particularly their persistence over time. Are networks 
that have been stimulated by policy of about the same effectiveness as 
cooperative relationship that emerged without public intervention and are they 
as robust? Last but not least, the involvement of different administrative levels 
could be an interesting issue. To what extent is it appropriate to involve local 
political bodies in the selection and finance of such a cooperation-contest?  
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